General Dynamics for two years resisted the urging of Grumman, chief subcontractor on the Navy version, for a new and more powerful engine. Only when experience made the switch imperative did it finally yield.

The propaganda smoke-screen and lack of candor persist. Thus, in his July testimony, Deputy Secretary Nitze sought to minimize the trouble the program is in. "Mr. Chairman," he stated, "I am just informed there were 127 mandatory deficiencies in the A–7 . . . This plane we are right now deploying. This confirms that this is usual." However, in a correction of the record, Mr. Nitze reduced the A–7's deficiencies to 102. At the request of the ever-alert Sen. McClellan, the record was further revised to show that at a comparable stage in the evaluation process, the A–7 had racked up only 18 "mandatory for correction" defects, compared with 100 for the F–111B.

In an even more brazen attempt at distortion, Robert A. Frosch, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research and Development), last week publicly asserted that carrier tests of the F–111B "are planned to begin within the current fiscal year, not two years from now." Here is the pertinent testimony to the contrary:

"Sen. McClellan. When will any version of the F–111B first land and take off from a carrier with the P–12 engine in it?

"Admiral Sweeney. We said the tests would begin in August 1969.

"Admiral Connolly. August 1969 is what we said."

The time has come for the nation to cut its losses. The TFX should be phased out as fast as the national security permits. Congress should launch a fresh investigation of the program that has gone from scandal to disaster, to fix the blame and to prevent a recurrence. Above all, through the power of the purse it should force a complete retreat of the Defense Department Whiz-Kids. In his farewell address, President Eisenhower warned against the so-called industrial-military complex. He should have aimed his fire at civilians who insist on playing soldier. Accountants and efficiency experts should take, not give, the orders.

ADM

THE ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE PROPOSAL

(Mr. HOLIFIELD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I wish to call to the attention of my colleagues a most important speech which was made yesterday by Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, before United Press International editors and publishers in San Francisco.

First, I want to say that it is a bit unusual for any Member to take the well of the House for the purpose of commending our Secretary of Defense for anything which he does. It is far more popular to add another lash on the back of the most popular whipping boy in the administration.

I do rise today, however, to commend Secretary McNamara for a most comprehensive and judicious exposition of the psychology and particularly of the problems of technology involved in adopting a policy of antiballistic missile defense of critical establishments in the United States. In my opinion the approach which has been decided upon is a reasonable approach, when related to the degree of technology of our country and the technology of possible enemies.

It is a program commonly called the "thin" line of defense, rather than the "massive" line of defense. For those critics who would not be satisfied with any act of Mr. McNamara's, I am sure the thin line will not be considered adequate. However, let me point out that a step-by-step advance toward a massive defense system is not incompatible or unreasonable when we consider that the "thin" line can be the first step if other steps become necessary, and when we consider that a massive defense system installed over a period of the next 5 to 10 years can be accommodated to our budget, and also more important to improvements in technology. In other words, each target defense installation can be installed independent of those in other geographical locations. Each successive target defense system can be improved with new discoveries and advances in technology.

In closing let me say that any antiballistic missile defense, whether it be "thin" or "massive" will not guarantee the United States that every enemy missile will be intercepted. Our present interception technology is far from being perfect. There are serious deficiencies in any defensive system which we can deploy. We must, therefore, maintain in the future as we have in the past, our massive power of offense.

To those who will immediately seize the opportunity to criticize the Secretary of Defense as having moved too little, too late—let me state emphatically that should the actions of the Red Chinese and Soviets force us to expand this system, I am confident that it will be expanded quickly. Their hostile actions should alone be the criterion for our further investment in this system.

To those who will now clamor for the "massive" defense, I would counsel "Let us meet the need as it becomes clear, rather than forcing our foes to even greater escalation." It is their choice. We have the capacity to respond quickly when response is necessary.

We must sooner or later realize that building bigger weapons systems just to be building them has in itself an effect on the course and direction of our foreign policy. Our options are limited—not expanded—by allowing these weapons to assume an unstoppable momentum.

The antiballistic-missile system will do little in and of itself to save millions of lives in this country should nuclear war occur. We must not be forced to rely on terminal solutions. Our deterrent capability must be flexible—a mix of strong offensive strength and protection at home of vital centers. I have long believed that "a good offense is the best defense"—that this is the most effective deterrent if its potential is fully understood by the Chinese and Soviets.

To those who guide the destinies of China and Russia I would counsel a close attention to the willingness of America to invest whatever is required to maintain our strength. It must be clear to our adversaries that we can pay any price, and that we will pay any price to protect the safety and security of our people. Perhaps that determination will convince the Soviets and Chinese that the arms race is folly—and that the continued building of these massive machines of war place further financial burdens on the people of their nation and ours. That building of greater and greater machines of war carries not only our hopes for deterrance of war, but the danger of destruction of civilization if deterrence fails.

We must not only consider offensive and defensive military methods, we must make every attempt possible through diplomatic channels to establish a peaceful world which will make it unnecessary for mankind to indulge in the madness of a nuclear missile interchange.

They must believe us when we say that we have met the test before. We can do so again. The next move is up to them.

ADM

McNAMARA'S SAN FRANCISCO SPEECH

(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, I also approve of Secretary McNamara's decision to deploy a so-called thin missile defense system against the Chinese nuclear threat. However, I am a little shocked that his speech went out of the way to depreciate the system by stating, page 22, "there are marginal grounds for concluding that a light deployment of U.S. ABM's against this possibility is prudent." Since the thing is going to cost $5 billion I would have hoped his decision might have been slightly more enthusiastic and based on something more than "marginal grounds." This is particularly true since the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for at least 2 years, have unanimously, to a man, recommended not only a thin system against the Red Chinese, but a full system capable of blunting Soviet attack as well. It is also true for the reason that but a few weeks ago the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy put out a report thoroughly, competently, and authoritatively documenting the reality and imminency of the China threat and left no room for doubt that ABM defense against it not only is prudent, but already is a little late in getting started. It appears the Secretary has little respect for the opinions of either the Joint Chiefs or the Joint Committee and others who for many months have had to take the case for deploying the system to the public and arouse public opinion to this gap in the arsenal of U.S. national security. In this context one legitimately wonders just how much of the Secretary's reasoning on this issue was in a military context and how much in a political context. One also legitimately wonders whether the decision was a thing of his own initiative or whether he was instructed to make the decision by his immediate superior.

I have only just received the complete copy of the Secretary's text and had to wade through 21 pages of apologies to the Kremlin for making this decision and promises that we would not expand it to before actually finding it stated at the

top of page 22 that the thin system is to be started.

It was interesting reading, however, not only for its semantic charisma, for its exposition of the Cambridge disarmament group's—Bethe, Wiesner, York, Lapp, Morgenthau, and others—various minimum deterrence—reciprocal reduction themes, but also for its sometimes subtle sophisms and other times plainly obvious gaps in logic. For instance:

Secretary McNamara thoroughly chastises the measurement of relative nuclear capabilities between two countries by counting nuclear delivery vehicles or counting the number of megatons of nuclear explosive power a country can deliver—page 7. Yet in another part of this speech—page 4—he devotes two full paragraphs to playing the exact "numbers game" he so abhors.

He states—page 6—that "neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can attack the other without being destroyed in retaliation." Which is just another way of saying that each has the other deterred from starting a nuclear war. Yet for many long months running into years the Secretary has again and again reiterated the argument that we should not bomb North Vietnam in a serious way because it would bring the U.S.S.R. into the war and risk a nuclear holocaust. My eyesight is not notably good. Maybe that is why I cannot see how he can have this argument both ways.

Secretary McNamara defines deterrence to mean "the certainty of suicide to the aggressor—not merely to his military forces, but to his society as a whole—page 3." He says this means, on our part, a capability to take his first-strike surprise attack and still be able to hit back with that kind of destructive attack in retaliation. His thesis is that the way the U.S. should maintain such a deterrent capability is through an "assured destruction" capability. That is, to forget about protecting our people and our armaments from the first strike with an ABM system and just concentrate on having enough nuclear hardware survive to retaliate with the necessary destruction. He apparently assumes Red Chinese leaders are crazy enough to make a suicidal first strike and suffer our retaliation. Apparently this is why he OK's a thin ABM system to reduce the damage of such an attack. He assumes Soviet Communist leaders are not carzy enough to make such a first strike and therefore no ABM defense against them is required. I assume Secretary McNamara has competent psychiatric reports on whoever rules these two countries today, but what about the unknowns who may in the future succeed them, suddenly or otherwise?

Secretary McNamara claims we have great nuclear superiority over the Soviets—page 8 and elsewhere. He postulates the question—page 13:

How can we be so certain that the Soviet cannot gradually outdistance us—either by some dramatic technological break-through, or simply through our imperceptively lagging behind, for whatever reason: reluctance to spend the requisite funds; distraction with military problems elsewhere; faulty intelligence; or simple negligence and naivete?

The Secretary describes his answer to the one as "simple and straightforward." It is:

We are not going to permit the Soviets to outdistance us.

Just how in the world are we going to stop Russian scientists from making some technological breakthrough or, recalling Cuba, guarantee against faulty intelligence or, after some of the performances over the last few years—the TFX, killing and then reviving the nuclear carrier, getting bogged down in a land war in Asia and so forth—rule out negligence and naivete? I doubt if the Secretary's answer to his self-posed question is as simple and straightforward as he has characterized it.

Although laying heavy burden on the matter of deterrence in most of his speech, Mr. McNamara left everyone wondering whether there is any validity at all to the theory of deterrence by tossing in for little apparent reason this statement—page 11:

Even with our nuclear monopoly in the early postwar period, we were unable to deter the Soviet pressure against Berlin, or their support of aggression in Korea.

From this did he mean to imply that the Soviets either do not believe the U.S. deterrent is credible or, if so, we do not impress them with a determination to use it, or both?

On the space of a single page of his speech—page 14—the Secretary really asks us to make a 180-degree turn in thinking. At the top of the page he argues that both the United States and Soviet Union have a great deal larger nuclear arsenal and second-strike capability than either needs because neither of us knew the intentions of the other and therefore built to cope with the "worst plausible case" as to the other's buildup. In the middle of the page he argues that we ought to agree to scale back these arsenals. At the bottom of the page he argues "it would not be sensible for either side to launch a maximum effort to achieve a first-strike capability" because "the intelligence-gathering capability of each side being what it is, and the realities of leadtime from technological breakthrough to operational readiness being what they are, neither of us would be able to acquire a first-strike capability in secret." Just how it can be that intelligence-gathering capabilities are inadequate as to second-strike capabilities but fully adequate as to first-strike capabilities is something of a mystery, despite leadtime considerations.

The McNamara speech contains lots of other things subject to possible compliment, comment, and criticism, but before anybody suggests starting to carve all its 25 pages in stone on the side of a mountain I thought it worthwhile to point out at least a few passages which might fail to justify such a lasting recordation.

RICHARD M. NIXON'S ARTICLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAGAZINE

(Mr. HOSMER asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, considerable interest in the press has been evidenced concerning former Vice President Richard M. Nixon's article in the just-released issues of Foreign Affairs for October. Since copies of the publication are hard to come by and there is widespread interest in the article, entitled "Asia After Vietnam," I have obtained unanimous consent for its reproduction below:

ASIA AFTER VIETNAM

(By Richard M. Nixon)

The war in Viet Nam has for so long dominated our field of vision that it has distorted our picture of Asia. A small country on the rim of the continent has filled the screen of our minds; but it does not fill the map. Sometimes dramatically, but more often quietly, the rest of Asia has been undergoing a profound, an exciting and on balance an extraordinarily promising transformation. One key to this transformation is the emergence of Asian regionalism; another is the development of a number of the Asian economies; another is gathering disaffection with all the old isms that have so long imprisoned so many minds and so many governments. By and large the non-communist Asian governments are looking for solutions that work, rather than solutions that fit a preconceived set of doctrines and dogmas.

Most of them also recognize a common danger, and see its source as Peking. Taken together, these developments present an extraordinary set of opportunities for a U.S. policy which must begin to look beyond Viet Nam. In looking toward the future, however, we should not ignore the vital role Viet Nam has played in making these developments possible. Whatever one may think of the "domino" theory, it is beyond question that without the American commitment in Viet Nam, Asia would be a far different place today.

The U.S. presence has provided tangible and highly visible proof that communism is not necessarily the wave of Asia's future. This was a vital factor in the turnaround in Indonesia, where a tendency toward fatalism is a national characteristic. It provided a shield behind which the anti-communist forces found the courage and the capacity to stage their counter-coup and, at the final moment, to rescue their country from the Chinese orbit. And, with its 100 million people, and its 3,000-mile arc of islands containing the region's richest hoard of natural resources, Indonesia constitutes by far the greatest prize in the Southeast Asian area.

Beyond this, Viet Nam has diverted Peking from such other potential targets as India, Thailand and Malaysia. It has bought vitally needed time for governments that were weak or unstable or leaning toward Peking as a hedge against the future—time which has allowed them to attempt to cope with their own insurrections while pressing ahead with their political, economic and military development. From Japan to India, Asian leaders know why we are in Viet Nam and, privately if not publicly, they urge us to see it through to a satisfactory conclusion.

II

Many argue that an Atlantic axis is natural and necessary, but maintain, in effect, that Kipling was right, and that the Asian peoples are so "different" that Asia itself is only peripherally an American concern. This represents a racial and cultural chauvinism that does little credit to American ideals, and it shows little appreciaion either of the westward thrust of American interests or of the dynamics of world development.

During the final third of the twentieth century, Asia, not Europe or Latin America, will pose the greatest danger of a confrontation which could escalate into World War